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Further readingI ~  Why does Europe need an economic and monetary union?
Agreements, even treaties between States, often overlook the essential point. This
frequently becomes clear only when it is too late. At that stage it is difficult to repair the
omission. In the mid-1950s the architects of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community drew up a plan for dismantling intra-Community customs barriers
which was carefully staged over 12 years. In the period of uninterrupted growth of the
1960s, the target was reached ahead of schedule.
1.  Interdependence of highly industrialized economies
The .customs union has been a resounding success and intra-Community trade in goods and
services has expanded rapidly: it now accounts for half of Member States' total foreign
trade, as against one third in 1958. During the same period Member States' foreign trade
increased threefold, and now accounts for no less than one quarter of gross Community
product (Le. of the aggregate amount of services supplied and goods produced in the
Community). In some Member States (Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg), the share of foreign trade actually exceeds 50%, while the figure for Denmark is
33%. In the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom this figure has risen
from around 20% to just under 30%, in Italy it is around 25%, while in France it is 20%.
A'quarter of the manufactures, farm products and services produced by the 300 million
people living in the Community are exported, so that foreign trade accounts for a quarter of
the income of the Community s population. However, this crucial last 25% of their
income is highly vulnerable as long as frontier posts remain in existence, and as long as
currency exchange rates can fluctuate sharply enough to price a country s products out of
foreign markets altogether. Where it is properly applied; without reliance on non-tariff
barriers, the customs union has eliminated the fear that tariff barriers beTWeen Community
countries might be restored overnight against member countries' goods, perhaps depriving
entire industries of their export markets. But it has not managed to prevent excessive
exchange-rate fluctuations, which can have as disruptive an impact on trade as customs
duties can, if not more. As a result, intra-Community trade is still faced with uncertainty,
despite the fact that the customs union has brought about an unprecedented degree of
interdependence between the Member States of what is a highly industrialized Community.The fact that the Member States already carry out more than 50% of their foreign trade
with one another reflects a degree of mutual reliance never before witnessed 
history. Indeed, Ireland and the three Benelux countries carry out between two thirds
and three quarters, and France, Italy, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and
Greece half of their trade with other member countries. The United Kingdom is the
exception, still transacting 60% of its foreign trade with non-member countries, but the
Community share of that country s foreign trade has already increased substantially.
Given this high degree of interdependence, a customs union alone cannot provide the
necessary long-term security: one pillar cannot suffice indefinitely to support the edifice
formed by the objectives laid down in the Treaty, namely improvement and alignment of
living standards and uniform development of all regions without structural imbalances and
distortions of composition. To this end, what is needed is the economic union which is
advocated in the Preamble to the Rome Treaty and which itself cannot be attained without
monetary union. Only within such a union can the convertibility of all member countries
currencies at fixed exchange rates be guaranteed, with the change-over to a single currency
becoming a mere formality that could be freely agreed upon.
The authors of the Treaty were quite content initially to urge in general terms coordination
of monetary policy 'to the full extent needed for the functioning of the common market'
with each Member State undertaking to 'pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the
equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency,
while taking care to ensure a high level of employment and a stable level of prices . In
addition, each member country was to regard its exchange-rate policy 'as a matter of
common concern It was only at the summit conferences of the Heads of State or
Government held in The Hague in December 1969 and in Paris in October 1972 that
objective of creating an economic and monetary union within 10 years and also of striving
to achieve European Union was defined in concrete terms.
2.  Safeguarding growth and employment
This major venture had, however, to be embarked on, between 1971 and 1973, in the midst
of a major crisis in the international monetary system by a Community that was also
preparing for the accession of Denmark, the United Kindom and Ireland. With little or
no synchronization of national economies and no Community exchange-rate. system to
ensure monetary cohesion, the currencies of the nine Member States making up the newly-
enlarged Community also diverged in the wake of the successive international monetary
cnses.
Those Member States whose currenCies were substantially revalued were compelled to
adjust their economies to the higher rate, to neglect branches of the economy with lower
value-added and to undertake as much rationalization as possible. As a result, they now
possess an efficient and modern industrial structure, but there is a shortage of customers for
their sophisticated products and services.INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE (1 000 million ECU)
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1958 1968 1973 1977 1979The Member States whose currencies lost ground during the international monetary crisis
found that, on an international comparison, they had become poorer in that they had to
pay more for their imports and received less for their exports. Some of them found that
they could no longer earn sufficient foreign exchange to purchase the tempting goods and
services their partners had to sell. Consequently, they were also unable to press ahead
with investment and rationalization schemes, and instead had to tighten their belts even
when their partners granted them credits. The result was that the recession hit strong-
currency and weak-currency countries alike. They have striven  in vain  ever since to
get their economies back on to a secure and steady growth path. 
In recent years the oil price increases have meant that all Member States have had to pay
more for their imports than they could earn from their exports.
For the relatively stronger countries to help pull their partners out of the recession, they
need to be able to count on a sustained expansion in demand, at least within the
Community, which is not continually undermined by monetary upheaval. Accordingly,
economic and monetary policies need to be worked out in common in order to achieve
growth and stability within a wider economic framework than the purely national
one. Because of the Community s substantial involvement in international trade, greater
growth and stability within toe Community would also benefit the rest of the world.
The existence of an economic and monetary union requires joint control of the money
supply  the bloodstream of economic activity. It also implies joint management of the
exchange rate (i.e. of prices), which determines economic relations with the rest of the
world. If each Member State regulates its money supply as it sees fit, no common
economic policy is possible. The paths of our economies would be bound to diverge, and
any common front shown towards the rest of the world would be more apparent than real.
Studies by experts have shown that economic and monetary union at an advanced stage
would be viable with a Community budget of between 5 and 7% of the combined national
products and indeed, in the pre-union phase, with one of between 2 and 3%. A budget of
this size would provide sufficient resources to finance the transfers necessary to guarantee a
more consistent development of economically backward parts of the Community and thus
ensure more rapid growth for all. There would be no need to pursue the ambitious
objective of a federal State modelled on the United States, where, for historical reasons
many responsibilities have been centralized and the federal budget accounts for as much as
20% of national product.
Clearly much would depend. on the economically stronger member countries being willing
to pay more into common budget than they get out of it so as to assist weaker
members. The latter, understandably, are unlikely to be enthusiastic about a Community
that lacks this kind of solidarity. Accounting for 1 % of national product, the present
Community budget is still too small to allow for solidarity of this kind, especially since the
bulk of the resources available has to be used, not for harmonizing structures, but for
maintaining balance on agricultural markets.3.  Strengthening the international monetary system
In its still incomplete form, there is another field in which the European Community is
failing to play the role that the other industrialized countries and developing countries are
entitled to expect of a grouping with such lofty political and economic objectives  that of
external relations. The reform of the international monetary system still left the dollar as
the main reserve currency. Less than 4% of the world's foreign exchange reserves are
held in the form of the Special Drawing Right, the neutral and jointly administered world
currency of the International Monetary Fund. Efforts in the International Monetary Fund
to make surplus dollar reserves exchangeable against Special Drawing Rights have so far
been unsuccessful. In practice a system of multiple reserve currencies has developed.
Whether or not the monetary authorities concerned are in favour, other central banks use
German marks, yen and Swiss francs as reserve currencies besides the dollar, while the
importance of the pound sterling as a reserve currency has declined.
But a system balanced on one big pillar and several lesser ones will be unsteady. It is in
constant danger of being shaken as reserves shift from one currency to another. Any
weakness in the US economy prompts investors to unload dollars and hold more yen or
German marks and Swiss francs. Conversely, if the German current account moves into
deficit, marks are sold and the rate of the mark plummets against the dollar.
However the Community as a whole is big enough to create a second strong world currency
that could underpin the international monetary system. It is of the size advocated by
economic theorists for a single currency area, and could develop into one of the major
currency areas in a future world economic system that has a stronger regional bias.
If there were a strong well-managed reserve currency in Europe besides the dollar
industrialized countries, oil-exporting countries and developing countries would no longer
need to fear the depreciation of their foreign exchange reserves. They would be able to
choose the currency in which to hold their reserves, and this would afford them a greater
degree of certainty in the long-term planning of their development and investment
programmes. Their orders would, with greater regularity, be channelled to the estab-
lished industrialized countries.
The United States and Europe would be compelled to manage their currencies with care
since countries could switch from one to the other, a possibility which the present system of
narrow-based national currencies offers only to a limited extent. A ,policy of 'benign
neglect' , of which the US monetary authorities have been accused in recent years as regards
the dollar, would no longer be conceivable. If the exchange rates o~ the major world
currencies could no longer fluctuate as widely as they have done of late, this would create
conditions much more favourable to long-term export business and investment decisions
thereby enhancing appreciably the prospects for continuing steady growth in a world
economy free from the disruptions suffered in the last few years. Exchange-rate
fluctuations complicate the analysis of the cost of internationally financed investment far
more than do changes in interest rates, as currency values can swing as much as 25%, and
even more, In a year.THE COMMUNITY'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
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Economic and monetary union is not only desirable for laying the foundations for fresh
growth within the Community and resolving the crisis within the world monetary system: it
is also absolutely essential if the degree of integration already achieved in the Community is
to be permanently secure in the long term. The general customs union established in the
1960s, including that part of it  the common market in farm products  which was most
difficult to put together, is placed in extreme jeopardy if we cannot stop Members States
currencies from diverging. As past events have shown on more than one occasion
member countries experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties then have virtually no
alternative but to resort to administrative impediments just within the bounds of legality in
order to curb, or make more expensive, imports from their Community trading
partners. The danger of a return to protectionism cannot be dispelled unless a currency
union is established within the Community.
The common market in agricultural products, which is managed on the basis of uniform
prices (calculated in fixed units of account), nowadays owes its continued existence to
makeshift measures such as monetary compensatory amounts. The countries with
appreciating currencies are unable to persuade their farmers readily to accept the income
losses they are bound to incur in the event of revaluation  vis-a-vi$  the unit of account. 
the other hand, the countries with depreciating currencies cannot persuade their consumers
readily to accept the increases in the import prices of essential foodstuffs associated with
any devaluation. And so, alongside the exchange rates applied generally, special rates for
farm products have come into being which diverge increasingly over time from the normal
exchange rates. This gives rise, at the point where industry and agriculture meet  Le.
the farm-product processing industry, ranging from tinned ham to chocolate 
distortions. in competition and to complications that have to be offset by special
compensatory mechanisms. Together with the differences in excise duties, it is these
mechanisms that are responsible for the fact that we find ourselves not in a tax-free and
duty-free economic area but in a customs union in which officials are still overworked and
exporters and importers almost strangled by red tape.
5.  Enlargement requires consolidation
The more countries join the Community, the more difficult it will be to hold together 
customs union that has not graduated to the status of an economic and monetary union
The Community, which has been joined by Greece in 1981 and has set itself the target of
admitting Portugal and Spain as members in the first half of the 1980s, must make the
quantum leap forward to monetary union if enlargement is not to result in the
achievements made so far being watered down or forfeited altogether. A currency
mechanism attempting to equalize the daily fluctuations of 12 currencies would have little in
common with a genuine customs union and would be virtually impossible to manage. The
acceding countries' high expectations from membership of the Community will not beTOTAL EC TRADE (intra-Community  trade and  external trade)
(1 000 million ECU)
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Source:  Eurostatfulfilled by a loose customs union. In their own interests and in those of the present
member countries, the Community the prospective members join must be a fully
operational one that has set itself definite objectives and gives them definite objectives as
well. On their side they must prepare over a transitional period to play their part in the
monetary union system.II ~ What are the barriers to attainment of economic and
monetary union?
1.  Need for democratic structures
, In its Member States' interests and in the interests of the world economy, the Community
must evolve into an economic and monetary union, but union cannot be imposed overnight
by a stroke of the pen. As past events have shown, it cannot even be achieved by way of
detailed stage-by-stage plans laid down in advance.
The governments and political parties of the individual Member States still retain
responsibility for the 'formulation of national economic policy and remain answerable to
their respective electorates for the consequences; especially if these include unemployment
and inflation. Before they can transfer responsibility for economic and monetary policy to
European-level bodies, governments must be certain that these bodies can and will
discharge these responsibilities properly. The man in the street must know for certain that
his democratic rights w~ll be safeguarded at European level too.
For this reason, direct elections to the European Parliament and a European monetary
union depend upon .each other. An economic and monetary union comprising States
grouped together on the basis of freedom is inconceivable in the absence of direct
legitimacy conferred by a body having powers of democratic controL On the other hand,
the directly-elected European Parliament would in the long term be relegated to a position
of impotence if it had no scope for influencing the key issues of economic and monetary
policy. This does not detract from the need for a European central bank that enjoys a
sufficient degree of independence  vis-ii-vis  the political authorities. The European central
bank and the bodies responsible for economic policy must be established in such a way that
they are able to operate at Community level as effectively as the most efficient national
authorities.
2.  Marked economic disparities
In addition to gradual development of democratic structures , a further  sine qua non  for
economic and monetary union is a basic consensus on the external and internal economic
ends to be pursued and on the means to be employed for this purpose. Achieving such aconsensus is not a straightforward matter in a Community which is marked by wide regional
disparities as regards development, whose Member States helve such different historical
backgrounds and in which the role played by gorvernment in the economy also varies very
widely from country to country. Recollecting the past, people in some countries take
fright at the mere thought of unemployment while, at the same time, they take a bout of
inflation fully in their stride. By contrast, people in other countries are, from experience,
allergic to a rate of inflation running at more than 4 to 5%.
The countries that have already brought inflation under control are reluctant to enter into
any .commitments  vis-a-vis  the countries that are still fighting two-figure or high one-figure
rates of inflation. Indeed, they are anxious lest, as part of a union, they should catch the
same disease. By contrast, the countries with high rates of inflation are afraid that they
might be forced too abruptly into a stable-price Community within which they would have
to sacrifice their growth prospects. Their fear is that a monetary union might dash their
chances of catching up economically with other countries by imposing the same pace 
development for all and thus freezing existing economic disparities. 
It is, however, common knowledge that high rates of inflation do not lend themselves to
coordination. Nor are they  to say the least  conducive to steady growth in the long
term. Therefore, there must be no slackening in the successful efforts made in recent
years to bring down the rates of inflation that got out of hand during the oil crisis. The
higher rates must be slowlY. and cautiously eased back to the average level of inflation in the
stability-conscious Member States. Inflation rates can be aligned, but only downwards
on the rates recorded in the low-inflation countries. As a centre of infection, inflation
must, like any other inflammation, be attacked and cured without damaging healthy parts
of the patient's body by unduly drastic action.
Once inflation has been contained and the conditions created for fostering balance-of-
payments equilibrium, the achievement of more vigorous growth in the less developed
countries will no longer be hampered by the fact that, after each promising upswing, these
countries have been obliged time and time again to take deflationary action. What will be
necessary, in these circumstances, will be for the Community to arrange the necessary
transfer of resources and provide graduated investment incentives with a view to putting
these countries and regions on the road to more rapid growth. It is precisely in periods of
economic crisis and unemployment that the need for solidarity is greatest.SHARE OF WORLD TRADE (including intra-Community trade)
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Source:  EuraslalIII  What has already been achieved?
Although the attempt to create an economic and monetary union in the 1970s by way of a
stage-by-stage plan spanning 10 years ended in failure, it would be a mistake to belittle
what had been achieved prior to the launching of the European Monetary System
(EMS). In the four strategic areas of monetary policy, economic policy, the efforts to
build up a common capital market, and tax harmonization, substantial progress had already
been made and important work carried out with a view to further development. And so
the scene was set for, and the machinery was ready to launch, the new EMS initiative on 13
March 1979.
Monetary policy
(a)  European exchange-rate  system
The Monetary Committee, which was set up in 1958, and the Committee of Governors of
the Central Banks, which came into being in 1964, are the specialist bodies responsible for
coordinating monetary policy within the Community. The essential component of the
European exchange-rate system, the currency snake, was the outcome of the first major
attempt to create an economic and monetary union, launched in 1969; the EMS was built
on this in 1979.
At the request of the Member States' Governments, a group of experts chaired by the then
Luxembourg Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Pierre Werner, produced in 1970 a
stage-by-stage plan for economic and monetary union based on a blueprint previously
drawn up by the European Commission. In March 1971, the Governments adopted the
main short-term proposals put forward by the group without, however, endorsing its more
far-reaching longer-term political implications. The approach advocated in the Werner
Plan and in the two ensuing Council Resolutions dated March 1971 and March 1972 centred
on the gradual reduction of exchange-rate fluctuations between Member States' currencies.
While the major world currencies were preparing in 1972/73 for the changeover to
unrestricted floating, the Member States of the Community were keen to limit the margin
within which their currencies were allowed to deviate from one' another to 2.25%. The
intention was to underpin monetary cohesion within the Community. The Member States
were to be given a yardstick against which, they would be able to assess their economicpolicies. A coordinated stabilization policy was to be pursued to ensure that the margin of
only 2.25% was observed against a background of a generalized floating. of curren-
cies. Provision was made for coordinated intervention to support currencies that were
temporarily in danger of being unable to keep within 'the lower limit of the margin of
fluctuation. The central bank of a country whose currency found itself in this precarious
position was to sell other currencies and purchase its own currency on the foreign exchange
markets in order to hold its rate steady. The central banks in the other member countries
were also committed to purchasing the threatened currency in order to support it, In the
normal course of events, there was to be an unlimited obligation to intervene on the
exchanges. The currency credits granted to the country with the threatened currency by
its partners were, as a rule, to paid back within four to eight weeks, unless they were
consolidated for longer periods under the support mechanisms available. If the day-to-
day fluctuations in the exchange rates of the currencies taking part in the Community
exchange-rate system are plotted on a graph, they produce a snake-like ribbon the width of
which varies depending on the gap between the strongest and the weakest currency
Hence, the Community exchange-rate system is also being referred to as 'the snake
In practice, however, not all the Member States were able to live up to the highly ambitious
objective underlying the Community exchange-rate sytem at a time of hectic fluctuations in
the world's currencies, particularly the dollar. In the course of time, the United Kingdom
and Ireland (June 1972), Italy, (February 1973), and France (January 1974 and, after re-
entering for a short while, again in March 1976) .and the associated non-member countries
Sweden (August 1977) and Norway (December 1978), withdrew from the snake. The
member countries that belonged to the snake on the eve of the changeover to the EMS
were the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Belgium, The Netherlands and
Luxembourg.
Despite all the monetary pressures it encountered, the Community exchange-rate system
did not deviate from its objectives and ensured that these would also be adhered to within
the EMS. Admittedly, the central rates of the currencies remaining in the snake had to be
adjusted on several occasions, The requirement that they must endeavour at all times to
remain within the margin of fluctuation prescribed was a great help to the countries
participating in the exchange-rate system in their efforts to achieve their stabilization
goals, At the same time , it made for close economic policy coordination between the
countries able to keep their exchange rates in step without unduly large adjustments. This
was particularly true of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries.
Establishment of the main monetary cooperation mechanisms in the Community 
including the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the European unit of account and
the monetary support mechanis:p1s  was attributable directly or indirectly, or linked, to
the European exchange=rate system (the snake),
(b) European Monetary Cooperation Fund
The European Monetary Cooperation Fund was set up in April 1973 and was concerned
primarily with managing the Community exchange-rate system (the snake) and the
Community s short-term monetary support mechanism.GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT MARKET PRICES AND EXPORTS AS % OF GDP, 1979
(per inhabitant at current prices and exchange rates)
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USA JAPANIt is through the Fund that the currency credits made available by Member States for
currency support measures were settled. Under the new European Monetary System
(EMS) which came into force in March 1979, the Fund continues, in the initial phase, to settle balances connected with intervention and short-term monetary support. In addition, it issues European currency units (ECUs) against deposit by Member States of a
given proportion of their gold and foreign exchange reserves. It is to be gradually
consolidated into a genuine European Monetary Fund which will manage, on behalf of the Community, part of Member States' gold and foreign exchange reserves.
(c) Short-term monetary support and medi~m-term financial assistance
Close cooperation between Member States on the monetary policy front requires financing
mechanisms that provide short-term support for action taken to maintain the cohesion of the European exchange-rate system and that provide medium-term relief for member
countries with balance-of-payments problems. At times of nervousness on foreign- exchange markets, the exchange rates of the Member States' currencies can be kept within
the desired narrow margin of fluctuation only by intervention on the part of the monetary
authorities. Under a system of short-term monetary support set in place as early as
February 1970, the central banks grant one another three-month credits for the purpose of
financing such support measures or helping member countries cope with temporary balance-of-payments deficits. These credits are renewable for a further three months.
system of medium-term financial assistance under which foreign-currency credits are
granted to a country for a period of between two and five years to help it overcome balance-of-payments deficits was adopted in March 1971. While short-term support is
granted unconditionally, medium-term balance-of-payments assistance is conditional upon
the recipient Member State taking steps to tackle effectively the causes of its payments
deficit. In December 1977, when the volume of credit available under this system was
doubled, measures were also taken to ensure closer supervision of compliance with the
economic policy conditions laid down in connection with the grant of credits. 
Credits are
granted in instalments or 'tranches' and the Council announces the release of each new
tranche only after it has been shown that the debtor country has, in the preceding period
complied with the economic policy conditions set. This procedure is designed to foster the
adjustment process in Member States which, for balance-of-payments reasons, have sought
assistance from their partners. The two support mechanisms described above are in no way designed to cut off Member States from the solidarity arrangements that have been
made at international level: whenever the Community s support mechanisms are to 
used, account is taken of the forms of assistance that may be available from other sources
g. the International Monetary Fund. Member States' contributions to the Community
support mechanisms are restricted to a specific amount. Each country is allocated quotas
within which it can count on support (debtor quotas) or is itself required to provide support
(creditor quotas).further instrument for assisting countries in balance-of-payments difficulties was
introduced in February 1975, when, in the wake of the oil price increases, some Member
States were forced to run up substantial current-account deficits. Acting on a proposal
from the Commission, the Council of Ministers. decided to authorize the issue of
Community loans on the international financial markets. In 1976- , Italy and Ireland
received an extra 1 600 million ECU in balance-of-payments support financed from the
proceeds of these loans. In 1981, again on a proposal from the Commission, the Council
decided to raise the ceiling for Community loans to 6 000 million ECU. This was intended
as a mark of Community solidarity at a time when all Member States were hard-hit by the
second wave of oil price increases and had run up large current-account deficits.
(d) European unit of a(:(:ount
Since its inception, the European Community has had to calculate Member States
payments to the Community budget and their reciprocal commitments and obligations by
reference to a unit of .account. While exchange rates between Member States were fixed
and based on a gold parity, the unit of account could be expressed by an amount fixed once
and for all in terms of the national currencies. But once the leading industrialized
countries decided to allow their exchanges rates to fluctuate on a day-to-day basis, the
Community was compelled to devise a unit of account that took account of changes in the
currencies' effective values.
In April 1975, a European unit of account (EUA), made up of a composite 'basket' of the
nine Member States' currencies , was introduced. Each currency was allocated a specific
weighting in the basket, reflecting the economic importance of the Member State
concerned. The value of the EUA  expressed in each of the Member States' currencies
and in the other major international currencies on the basis of quotations on the official
foreign-exchange markets  is calculated each day by the Commission.
With this unit of account, renamed 'ECU' for EMS purposes , the Community possesses a
practical accounting instrument that enables it to evaluate Member States' commitments
and obligations according to their real value. Slowly but surely, use of the EUA as an
accounting device is being .extended to an increasing number of fields of Community
activity. Since 1975, it has been applied in connection-with the European Development
Fund, set up to assist the 60 or so African, Caribbean ,and Pacific (ACP) countries that are
signatories with the Community to the Lome Convention. The European Investment
Bank in Luxembourg also uses the new unit for its balance sheet and for its loan
operations. In 1978, the Community drew up its own huqget for the first time in EUA.
Although, at present, the ECU is first and, foremost an accounting instrument, the
Commission maintains interest-bearing balances expressed in ECU in banks in several
Member States with a view to maintaining the value of its budget resources. The ECU is
not yet used as an instrument for effecting payments. For the purposes of the European
Monetary System, the ECU has been assigned new functions. The name 'ECU' goes back
to the old gold and silver coins that were in circulation in France for several hundred years
and it is the acronym of 'European currency unit'.EUR 10: 248,
USA: 123.4
Source:  IMF
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(at end 1980  1 000 million ECU)2.  Coordination of economic policy
Although currencies and the exchange rates between them determine trade patterns, they
are merely a reflection of underlying economic realities. The Community endeavours to
influence the exchange rates between Member States' currencies in such a way as to bring
about a greater degree of convergence between national" economies. Thus, monetary
policy is not an end in itself but an instrument for working towards the real objective ---
closer alignment of national , economies and elimination of regional and structural
disparities that are incompatible with an economic union.
With a view to bringing economic policies more closely into line, the Commission began
issuing annual economic policy recommendations to Member States as early as the
1960s. Since July 1969, a Member State contemplating important short-term economic
policy decisions or measures likely to have a substantial impact on the economies of other
member countries or on the situation in the Member State concerned, has bee~ required
. under a Council decision to hold prior consultations.
Since 1971, the Council has carried out three times each year an examination of the
economic situation in the Community, based on commpnications from the Commission
and has drawn up short-term economic policy guidelines to be observed by the Community
and by each individual Member State in the interests of more harmonious economic
development. Each year, the Commission presents a report on the economic situation
which is adopted by the Council and is intended as a guide for Member States' economic
and budgetary policy decisions,
In 1974, the objectives underlying economic policy con:vergence and the resulting economic
policy requirements imposed on Member States were given clearer shape in a basic di-
rective on stability, growth and full employment and in a decision concerning the con-
vergence of economic policies. To foster closer economic policy coordination, a special
Coordinating Group was set up at the Council in 1972 which brings together Commission
representatives and representatives of the competent ministry in each Member State. 
1974, the three separate committees responsible at the time for short-term economic
policy, for medium-term economic policy and for budgetary policy were merged into a
single committee, with sub-committees, in the interests of effective coordination.
Despite these more sophisticated arrangements, the goal of improved coordination of
economic policies could not be achieved in the wake of the oil crisis, Price escalations got
out of hand in 1974 and 1975 in several Member States and it was only during 1977 and 1978
that it proved possible temporarily to halve the span of inflation rates among Member
States, which at one stage had ranged between 6% and 25%. Since 1979, inflation rates
have again diverged as a result of the latest oil price rises and it is proving particularly
difficult to bring them closer. together again.
3.  Structural policy
(a) Medium-term programmes (covering five years)
Since 1964, the Community s medium-term and longer-term economic policy objectives
have been formulated by a committee responsible for medium-term economic policy andsubmitted by the Commission to the Council for approval, in the form of programmes.
The programmes lay down for the Member States not only quantitative growth targets but
also qualitative structural and social-policy objectives.
This has been by no means a simple matter in a Community in which some Member States
placed their faith first and foremost in market forces whereas others advocated a greater
degree of economic planning~ Thanks to the medium-term programmes drawn up,
economic forecasting techniques applied in Member States have become more
comparable. Indeed, the planning work and the associated coordinating work have
forged closer cross-frontier links between government departments and promoted mutual
understanding of the different concepts and methods applied. By contrast, it has not been
possible in all Member States to put fully into practice at economic policy level the
objectives laid down in the medium-term programmes, and, as a result, these have been
implemented only in piecemeal fashion.
(b) Regional  and  industrial .policies
The major structural disparities between the national economies and the major regional
development disparities within the individual Member States can be remedied neither by a
coordinated short-term economic policy nor by medium-term programmes alone. What is
needed is a genuine transfer of resources from the richer to the poorer regions of the
Community.
The key instrument for ironing out regional disparities is intended to be the Regional Fund,
which, however, was set up only in 1974 and has since had to be content with an admittedly
growing but as yet modest budget. In the Fund's early years, Community funds could
normally be granted only in the form of support for Member States' national development
programmes. In the future, specific measures taking greater account than in the past of
the Community s objectives and needs are also to be taken at Community level to improve
regional structures. An amount equal to 5% of the Fund's resources and not tied to
specific countries has been allocated for this purpose.
Industrial policy, as well as regional policy, has a important contribution to make to
structural improvement. A common market signifies change and renewal. Industries
that have found themselves isolated behind national frontiers and without a future must
adjust to a wider, unrestricted market and encouragement must be given to the creation of
new, forward-looking industries and services branches. The Community must foster the
continuing adjustment process, provided it is carried out under conditions of fair
competition. Without this process, uncompetitive industries would be kept artificially
alive. A retreat into protectionism and the break-up of the single market would then be
unavoidable. The Community must, however, see to it that redundant workers are
reasorbed into economic system with the help of the Social Fund and of the adjustment
provisions laid down in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.
The Community has, in fact, already done a great deal to help redeploy hundreds of
thousands of workers who had ~ost their jobs and has also helped with the introduction ofearly retirement schemes. However, the resources available for combating unemploy-
ment are altogether inadequate. To a large degree, reintegration of workers and
unemployment benefit provision are .still regarded as the concern of the national
authorities.
( c ) Financing instruments
Financing new jobs and promoting structural change require large amounts of investment
credits, which in the normal course of events are provided by existing financial institutions
and the financial markets. The Community, however, must step in to help finance the
creation of new jobs, at least in those areas where the common market is speeding up the
pace of structural change and the rate of closures of obsolete plant.
The European Investment Bank, a public body with legal personality, was set up in 1958
primarily to help develop the Community s less advanced areas. It is an instrument for
financing plant modernization or conversion schemes or job-creation schemes and for
providing Member States with financial assistance for joint projects of Community
interest. By 1981, the EIB had granted credits of around 15 000 million ECU, and 
recent years has stepped up its lending operations to an annual rate of over 2 000 million
ECU.
Under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, which came into
force in 1952, the then High Authority and the present Commission, as its successor, have
made available to the coal and steel industries credits totalling 7 000 million ECU. The
coal industry had to contend with major conversion difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s
while it is now the steel industry that is facing the same problems.
In 1976, the Council authorized the Commission to issue loans totalling 500 million ECU
for financing the construction of nuclear power stations, to help meet the Community
energy requirements.
In mid-1978, as its contribution towards combating economic stagnation and resolving the
structural crises affecting several industrial sectors, the Council authorized the Commission
to float loans totaling 1 000 million ECU on the international financial markets. The
European Investment Bank is responsible for managing the credit operations on behalf of
and in conjunction with the Commission. This has provided the Community with a
further  admittedly limited  source of funds to promote and facilitate structural
change. In 1980, the Community granted loans and interest subsidies totalling 4500
million ECU and 200 million ECU respectively.
Through the Guidance and Guarantee Sections of the European Agricultural Fund, the
Commission each year allocates some 1 000 million EUA to improving agricultural
structures. This makes it easier for farmers to switch to modern production methods and
to the kind of high-value products for which there are ready markets.
Although the total resources that the Community can make available through its financing
instruments represent only some 0.3% of Community gross national product, they have a
pump-priming effect because they are directed to specific regional and sectoral measures.BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (current account) 1 000 million ECU
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Source:  Eurostat YEAR4.  Free movement of capital
There can be no economic and monetary union or common market without the free
movement of capital, allowing investors to move funds at will to the places where the best
yields are available. In a large, free-enterprise economic entity with balanced structures
maximum return on investment should reflect maximum economic utility.
The Community, however, still has a long way to go before it can be described as a
common market with balanced structures. The countries with the weaker structures and
currencies thus attempt' to curb the outflow of domestic savings by imposing bans and
contrQls on such movements of capital. Their currencies and economic prospects are not
sufficiently sound and attractive to encourage an inflow of enough private capital from
other Member States. Since it has not been possible to bring economic structures more
closely into line, the liberalization of capital movements has also not proceeded much
beyond the initial measures provided for in the two relevant directives adopted in 1960 and
1962. These directives have facilitated trade between Member States, cross-frontier
payments of wages and salaries and of fees, cross-frontier payments effected in respect of
services rendered, and the granting of short-term and medium-term trade credits by
prohibiting restrictions on such capital movements; but the granting of financial credits for
industrial investments, capital investments and cross-frontier dealing in quoted securities
may still be made subject to restrictions,
Instead of forming a common capital market on which surplus saving in the richer countries
and regions are transfered to the poorer countries and regions, national markets are still
isolated from one another. As a result, the so-called Euromarkets, on which operations
involving international foreign currency credits are transacted, have become the main
channel for capital movements. On these markets, however, weak-currency countries
have to borrow in hard currencies since their own vulnerable currencies are not acceptable
to the market. Although the deadlock in further progress towards achieving free
movement of capital was broken in 1980, in spite of the recession, by the complete removal
of restrictions in the United Kingdom and by partial liberalization in France, it will finally
be overcome only gradually, as progress is made in the other fields appertaining to
economic and monetary union.
5.  Tax harmonization
In the field of tax harmonization too, there has really been only one important milestone
namely the abolition of cumulative turnover tax, the full burden of which fell on every
product at every level of distribution and which served to restrict and distort most
drastically not only free movement of goods but also competition. Cumulative turnover
taxes have been replaced by value-added tax systems in all Member States. Value-added
tax (VAT) is leVied at each distribution level only on the increase in value contributed 
that level and the overall burden of taxation is no longer a function of the number of
distribution levels a product passes through before reaching the consumer.But there is still a long way to go before VAT systems and rates are harmonized. The
standard rate of tax in the individual Member States ranges between 10% and
26%. There are even greater disparities as regards exemptions, reduced rates for
essential goods and increased rates for luxury goods. These remaining disparities and the
various excise duties, particularly those on spirits, tobacco and oil, continue to hamper the
free movement of goods. They are the cause of the queues of lorries we see at the
Community s internal frontiers and of the customs checks imposed on travellers since these
tax differentials must be offset at frontiers by tax refunds in the exporting country and by
taxation in the importing country.
For ordinary travellers, the Commission has been able to introduce exemptions, at least for
the quantities normally allowed for tourists.
For revenue purposes, some member countries prefer to rely most on indirect taxes on
consumption and apply correspondingly high VAT and excise duty rates, while others
derive the bulk of their revenue from high direct taxes on income and wealth. These
differences of emphasis stem from deep-rooted historical and psychological factors. They
can be evened out only if economic structures are gradually brought more closely into line.
No action has yet been possible as regards harmonization of direct taxes on firms
particularly corporation tax and rules on depreciation. The Commission had to concen-
trate first of all on those direct taxes that constituted substantial barriers to the free
movement of capital and to investment. For this reason, it is focusing its efforts on
abolishing forms of tax discrimination between parent companies and subsidiarie.s
operating in different member countries, on taxes imposed on dividends, on the special
forms of withholding tax and on co~bating tax avoidance and evasion in so far as such
efforts can be of value in helping to complete a customs union which has still not reached
the stage of economic and monetary union.IV  The  new European  Monetary System (EMS)
1.  Return to monetary policy cohesion
Implementation of the stage-by-stage plan for creating an economic and monetary union
out of the Community did not prove possible during the 1970s. The difficulties the
individual Member States have had to contend with have shown, however, that economic
and monetary union has not become less important but is even more essential than
before. With half of their imports and exports coming from or going to their Community
partners and with their foreign trade accounting for one quarter of the Community
national product, the member countries are already heavily dependent upon one another
and the interpenetration of their economies is far advanced. The Community s internal
trading area, the future of which is in our own hands, must now be made secure and the
danger of divisive protectionism within Europe, which looms larger with every day of
inaction, removed once and for all.
The Community must return to a path of growth and stability. Without stability, Member
States will struggle along divergent paths as inflation impoverishes some of them without
the others being any better off. This is because without adequate growth the weak-
currency countries are unable to purchase enough goods and services from their partners to
prevent the mass of unemployed growing throughout the Community. Time and time
again in recent years, some member countries have had to cut back on the orders they
placed with their partners because they did not have enough currency reserves to pay the
bills. As a result, workers in other member countries lost their jobs.
The year 1977 brought a revival of interest in the objective of. economic and monetary
union  an ambition which had appeared to have been shelved. In October 1977, the
then Commission President, Roy Jenkins, reminded Member States' Governments of the
merits of a single currency. At the end of 1977 the CommIssion laid before the Council an
action programme for the years ahead. This programme was aimed at steering the
Community back on to a path of growth and stability  the prerequisites for any monetary
union  by way of closer coordination of economic and monetary policies.
The ..year 1978 then saw the launching of a pratical  albeit limited  initiative by the
French President and the German Chancellor to set up a European Monetary System. All
three meetings of the European Council of Heads of State or Government held in 1978were dominated by this subject. At the April meeting in Copenhagen, the plan was
discussed for the first time; at the July meeting in Bremen, basic features were approved;
and at the December meeting in Brussels, the resolution was adopted in which the Heads of
State or Government of all nine countries expressed their support for the new system.
The year 1979 witnessed the formal introduction of the EMS, while 1980 was the year in
which the system proved its worth, for the EMS central rates remained unchanged.
The new European Monetary System must not be confused with the projected economic
and monetary union, let alone with a common currency. Its immediate limited objective
is to create a zone of monetary stability in Europe by closer monetary policy cooper-
ation. It will initially be used as an instrument for combating excessive fluctuations in
exhange rates and hence for reducing a factor of uncertainty in trade and payments
between Member States. In addition, through a more stable exchange-rate policy, it will
endeavour to create room for an economic policy geared to achieving a greater measure of
internal and external stability.
2.  The ECU as the pillar of the system
The system combines well-tried practices from the currency snake and a new ECU-based
procedure for keeping currencies more closely in line than previously and preventing them
from drifting apart. The ECU, which lies at the centre of the European Monetary
System , is used as the denominator or  numeraire  for the exchange-rate mechanism, as the
basis of the divergence indicator, as the denominator for operations under the intervention
and credit mechanisms and as a means of settlement between monetary authorities. It is
thus the new European unit of account, which is not yet a generally accepted means of
payment but is intended to be used increasing as such, initially between Member States
central banks and subsequently perhaps in connection with international capital
1I\0vements. The ECU is a basket of nine Member State' currencies. The intention is
that the Greek drachma should be included in the ECU basket within five years of Greece
accession to the Community, Le. before 1 January 1986. The amount of each currency in
the basket corresponds to the economic importance of the country in question. In this
way, the weight of each currency influences the value of the ECU basket, which is
calculated each day by the Commission on the basis of quotations on the relevant national
foreign exchange markets.
As in the snake, a grid of bilateral exchange rates has been established restricting the
margin of fluctuation to 2.25% either way. Only Italy has' opted to apply initially a wider
margin of 6%. When a currency is in danger of leaving the grid as its exchange rate
fluctuates by more than 2.25% (or 6% in the case of Italy), this currency must be supported
through intervention, Le. it must be bought by the central bank responsible for the
currency which has risen to the upper limit of its margin.
In addition to this conventional policy of intervention, provision has been made for
preventive measures where a currency deviates unduly (by more than 75% of its margin)WHAT IS THE ECU?
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The ECU is composed of the following amounts of national currencies:
828 German mark (DM) 3.66 Belgian francs (BFR) 15 French francs (FF) 0,140 Luxembourg franc (LFR)
0885 pound sterling (UKL) 0,217 Danish krone (DKR) 109 Italian lire (LIT) 0,00759 Irish pound (IRL)
286 Dutch guilder (HFL)
The equivalent of the ECU in a given national currency is equal to the sum of the
equivalents of the above amounts in that currency. The ECU equivalents in the
Member States' currencies are calculated every day and published in the  Official
Journal of the European Communities,  as well as in many newspapers.from its average ECU rate. When this threshold of divergence is crossed, the country
concerned is expected to correct the situation by taking appropriate measures. These
comprise intervention in various currencies, domestic monetary policy measures (e.g. in
respect of interest rates), other economic policy measures (e.g. in the field of taxation or
incomes policy) and, lastly, changes in the central rate itself. Changes in the central rate
must not become the rule when a country experiences difficulties. Such changes should be
carried out, however, where underlying economic circumstances have altered: they should
, not be delayed or ruled out for reasons of prestige. In the first two years of operation
there were only two minor adjustments to central rates, with interest rates as a rule being
raised or lowered as soon as the divergence indicator was triggered.
The funds available for defensive action have been increased significantly under the new
system. The central banks' currency debts arising from intervention now have to be
settled after 45 days rather than after 30 days as before. At the same time, short-term
monetary support can now be extended for two further three-month periods instead of one
with the result that such support can now be granted for nine months in all. The amount
available for short-term support has been increased to 14 000 million ECU and that for
medium-term financial assistance, granted for between two and five years, to 11 000
million ECU. This means that the potential volume of credits available under support
mechanisms for defending currencies' central rates against speculation has been increased
almost three-fold. It is now easier to repay currency credits since all participating
Member States deposit with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, on loan, 20% of
their gold and dollar reserves and receive in return a corresponding amount of
ECU. They can use the latter to repay 50% of their debts while the remainder must be
covered from national reserves.
Although the United Kingdom was in favour of setting up the new system in 1978 and
endorses the European Council Resolution of 5 December 1978, which forms the
foundation for the new system, it was unable to participate in the exchange rate and
intervention mechanism straightaway because at the time sterling was strongly buoyed up
by North Sea oil coming on stream and because inflation in 1979 and 1980 was still.very
high. As a result, sterling remained unsettled on the exchanges and would have disrupted
the system if it had joined immediately. The United Kingdom intends to participate in the
mechanism once sterling has consolidated its position.
Similarly, Greece was unable to bring the drachma into the EMS exchange rate and
intervention mechanism immediately upon joining the Community on 1 January
1981. Inflation in that country, at 25% in 1980, far exceeded the Community average of
12%, which was itself much too high. 
The arrangement for depositing gold and dollar reserves was the first step towards
establishing a genuine European reserve fund - largely a symbolic step, since the reserves
remain the property of Member States' central banks even though their corresponding
value in ECU is used to finance intervention.
The dollar and gold reserves are valued at their respective market rates. After the EMS
was launched, the gold price, which is determined on a narrow market, more than doubledand at times even tripled. As a result, the value of the reserves deposited by the Member
States with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which had initially stood at 26 000
million ECU, roughly doubled.
Some Member States, notably Belgium, have made calls on these ECU-denominated
reserves to finance intervention in support of their currencies. The short-term and
medium-term credit mechanisms were not activated, one reason being that all Member
States recorded a negative balance of foreign-exchange payments in 1980 and so would not
have been in a position to make available any surpluses of their own to enable their
partners to plug their deficits, as had frequently happened in the 1970s,
3.  The Community s contribution towards stabilizing the world economy
In its first two years of operation, the EMS exchange rate and intervention mechanism
achieved everything expected of it on the monetary policy front but did not meet all
expectations in the economic policy field, Since the system was set up, the exchange rates
of the participating currencies have largely kept in step, apart from two downward
adjustments of the Danish krone totalling 7% and a 2% upward adjustment of the
mark. The markup to March 1981 thus rose by 1.15% against the average value of the
ECU, whereas the other currencies fell by 0.83%, with the exception of the Danish krone
which fell by 8.25%.
The European Monetary System displayed a remarkable degree of currency stability in an
unsettled period marked by sharp fluctuations in the dollar and the yen and a switching of
funds into gold on several occasions. Apart from the lira, which, if we disregard the
adjustment made in the autumn of 1979, observed its wider permitted margin of 6%, the
EMS currencies kept within their 2.25% margins. Sterling, which had not joined the
system, was the only Community currency to experience a primarily oil-induced increase in
its exchange rate which, if it had been participating in the mechanism, would have
prompted a revaluation, even though as recently as 1978 sterling had been regarded, if
anything, as a candidate for devaluation.
Within the EMS, Community currencies were used for the purpose of smoothing exchange-
rate movements to a greater extent than in the earlier currency snake, one main reason
being that three of the four major Community currencies are once again involved in the
new exchange-rate mechanism. Intervention was by no means geared solely to stemming
arise in the mark: from time to time the mark had to be supported by the French franc and
by the Dutch guilder when it was at the bottom of the grid.
Within the EMS too, the central banks' were obliged to commit more funds to smoothing
fluctuations in the dollar than to absorbing movements in their own currencies. And so
through the EMS, the Community made a contribution towards stabilizing the internatio-
nal monetary system. Admittedly, there has as yet been no genuine coordination between
the different monetary authorities' intervention policies towards the dollar: not infre-
quently, while some central banks have sold dollars in order to support their currenciesothers have been buying them in order to avert an excessive slide in the dollar. However
it is in the Community s interest to prevent excessive fluctuations in the dollar that push up
inflation in the Community.
The EMS, which was designed to steady exchange-rate movements and thereby to bring
about closer convergence of economic performances, and in particular lower rates of
inflation and improved payments balances, bad still to make its mark on the ecopomic policy
front. It went through a particularly difficult period when all the Member States were
hard hit by the fresh wave of oil price rises. These increases triggered a fresh bout of
inflation, which of course is never the same in different countries. It was only in the
Federal Republic of Germany and in the Benelux countries ~hat inflation was kept down to
single figures. The other Member States, despite major efforts to contain prices, recorded
double-digit inflation.
4.  Step by step towards the prime objective
In its Resolution of 5 December 1978, the European Council announced that it was 'firmly
resolved to consolidate, not later than two years after the start of the EMS scheme, into a
final system the provisions and procedures thus created' . This system was to 'entail the
creation of the European Monetary Fund.,. as well as the full utilization of the ECU as a
reserve asset and a means of settlement' and was to be ' based on adequate legislation at the
Community as well as the national level'
But the Heads of State or Government had underestimated the ' technical , legal and
political problems and difficulties of moving on to the final stage of the EMS, For
instance, they did not make allowance for the fact that the creation of a body which
involved the partial transfer of monetary policy responsibilities to the Community would
necessitate changes in several Member States' legislation that would require ra~ifica-
tion. Although, at its meeting in Luxembourg on 1 December 1980, the European
Council reaffirmed its determination to further strengthen the EMS until transition to the
institutional stage at the appropriate time, it did not set any date for that transition, but
merely called upon the Commission and the Council of Ministers to .continue their
preparatory work. 
It will probably take a few more years before the Community 'is able to make the transition
to the final stage of the EMS. In the meantime, any further steps that can be taken
directly, i.e. that do not require a new legal basis or ratification at national level, should be
taken. This would effectively and pragmatically pave the way for the final stage,
One direct way in which to promote the further development of the EMS is to gradually
strengthen the role allotted to the ECU. This would involve, in the first place
dismantling the restrictions on the use of the ECU for settling payments between Member
States' central banks , and empowering the central banks to keep part of their reserves in
ECU and to use the ECU increasingly as an instrument for settling creditor or debtor
balances within the Community.POPULATION AND CIVILAN LABOUR FORCE (1 000)
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1981 Source:  EurostatConsideration also ought to be given to ways and means for making the ECU more
attractive. The International Monetary Fund set a useful precedent when, on 1 January
1981, it adopted measures designed to make the Special Drawing Right more attractive asa
currency unit by basing it on a basket of the five major world currencies  the US dollar
the Japanese yen, the German mark, sterling and the French franc. The ECU ought to be
sufficiently attractive to be used not only in transactions between central banks but also
outside the central bank system, on private money and capital markets. It should be
developed gradually into a currency that would also be held by investors in non-
Community countries and that would attract oil producers' surpluses into the Com-
munity. It could then serve to relieve the strain on Member States' national currencies.
The Community institutions themselves should consider floating ECU-denominated loans
now that the Council has authorized such operations under the New Community
Instrument.
The EMS would also have to be keyed to put pressure on the Member States to reduce
their inflation rates. An inflation indicator could be introduced: if the rate of inflation in a
particular country climbed too sharply, this should prompt the country concerned to take
more energetic corrective action.
Initial progress towards closer coordination of national monetary policies towards the
dollar could be made by pooling the individual short-term credit agreements (swaps)
concluded by Member States' central banks with the US federal reserve system. Greater
parallelism between EMS currencies in the face of fluctuations in the dollar is essential to
the cohesion of the EMS.
With a view to the final stage of the EMS, it.will be important to decide in the medium term
what responsibilities will need to be entrusted to the European Monetary Fund and to its
administrative authorities in order to ensure that the EMS comes up to expectations in the
long term. In the final stage, a European Monetary System and a European Monetary
Fund must be responsible for framing the Community s internal and external monetary and
exchange-rate policies. This will require detailed studies of the ways in which the present
responsibilities for managing the domestic money supply and the external exchange rate
can be transferred from the Member States to the Community. This task will not be made
any easier by the fact that in some Member States the central banks have wide discretionary
powers in the area of monetary policy while in others they are much more strictly bound by
government directives.
European Monetary System that features a European currency authority will be
endorsed by all the Member States' parliaments only if it accords high priority to preserving
the value of money and provides guarantees that the supply of a European currency will be
at least as closely controlled and as soundly managed as the best Community currency. 
things now stand, it will be no easy matter to introduce monetary harmonization. A
family builds its house to last a lifetime and so it must rest on solid foundations. Similarly,
the Community must address itself in earnest to the preparations for a common currency
edifice with solid foundations that can withstand any upheaval.Further reading
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